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Language and Knowledge in Wittgenstein 
João Henrique dos Santos Rodrigues Nogueira Souto 
 
ABSTRACT 
The aims of this dissertation are to both analyze and problematize the relationship between two 
key concepts in philosophy – language and knowledge – using Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work. A 
corpus constituted by Wittgenstein’s main texts was assembled for the analysis. The main works 
that make up this corpus are the Notebooks 1914-1916, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and 
the Philosophical Investigations. In this dissertation, it is argued that the concepts of language 
and knowledge are interconnected, that our access to reality is dependent on our language and 
that the construction of knowledge is a process intrinsically dependent on language. 
Keywords: Intelligence, Knowledge, Language, Logic, Wittgenstein  
 
RESUMO 
O objetivo desta dissertacã̧o é o de analisar e problematizar a relacã̧o entre dois conceitos 
fundamentais em filosofia – linguagem e conhecimento – tendo por base o trabalho desenvolvido 
por Ludwig Wittgenstein. Para a realizacã̧o do trabalho que aqui se apresenta constituiu-se um 
corpus de análise a partir das principais obras de Ludwig Wittgenstein, entre as quais se realçam 
Cadernos 1914-1916, o Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus e as Investigações Filosóficas. 
Nesta dissertacã̧o argumenta-se que os conceitos de linguagem e conhecimento estão 
interrelacionados, que o nosso acesso à realidade é dependente da nossa linguagem e que a 
construção do conhecimento é um processo intrinsecamente dependente da linguagem.  
Palavras-chave: Conhecimento, Inteligência, Linguagem, Lógica, Wittgenstein   
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1. Introduction 
In an ever more rapidly changing world, the question of whether the changes are taking us in the 
right direction is increasingly pertinent. As globalization permeates every tissue of modern 
society, people from different cultures blend together and an increasing number of people speak 
multiple languages fluently, we are left wondering what that means for human language. Looking 
back into history, we see that as languages evolved from mere simple dialects into more complex 
forms of communication, cave drawings appeared, and then finally writing, humans were able, 
somewhere along the way, to gain knowledge. 
Language was fundamental in terms of providing a means for communication between 
people which has produced different forms of knowledge. Moreover, if we look back to the first 
traces of written text, we come to the realization that in human evolution, written forms of 
communication represent only a very small fraction of our time in history, while representing at 
the same time our most prolific period. Shall we then conclude that the evolution of human 
language is what makes knowledge and all other forms of evolution possible and, if we dare to 
go one step further, to the realization that the ever quickening pace of change in the world is due 
to nothing but increasingly rapid changes in human language? 
 
1.1 Motivation 
Knowledge is an elusive topic, as David Lewis has shown1, with several different theories and 
perspectives behind its construction and several others threatening it. In fact, Descartes’s 
“demon” cannot be logically dismissed, and Kant made a powerful case2 that our access to reality 
is limited to representations of it, and that access to the Ding an sich is impossible from our 
human perspective. Obviously, we cannot a priori dismiss a skeptical view on knowledge, but we 
need to make some assumptions in order to move forward and establish a system where 
                                                          
1 Lewis, D. “Elusive Knowledge”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74(4), 1996, 549–567. 
2 Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.  
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knowledge is in fact possible. What these assumptions are constitutes part of the motivation 
behind this work. 
 Since the beginning of his philosophical studies, Ludwig Wittgenstein wanted to use logic 
to understand our place in the world. He famously wrote in one of his notebooks: 
 
Logic must take care of itself (NB, 22.8.14) 
 
With the Notebooks 1914-19163 and even before, with the Notes on Logic (NL), included as 
Appendix A to the Notebooks, Wittgenstein wanted to do nothing more than to discover “the 
logic” behind the fabric of “reality”. While the “early” Wittgenstein might have thought he had 
discovered the logic behind reality at the end of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus4, the “later” 
Wittgenstein5 was more cautious when reaching conclusions, as we can see in the Philosophical 
Investigations6. However, Wittgenstein’s work on the complexity of language demonstrates that 
a link exists between language and knowledge. As he states in On Certainty7: 
 
You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is 
not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). 
It is there - like our life. (OC § 559) 
   
And the concept of knowing is coupled with that of the language-game. (OC § 560) 
 
                                                          
3 Wittgenstein, L.  Notebooks 1914-1916, 2nd edn. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright. Translated by 
G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1979. 
4 Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. Translated by C. K. Ogden. London: Routledge, 1922. 
5 See section 2.4 for a discussion of the “early” vs the “later” Wittgenstein. 
6 Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations. Edited by G.E.M Anscombe and R. Rhees. Translated by G. E. M. 
Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953. 
7 Wittgenstein, L. On Certainty. Edited by G. E. M Anscombe and G. H. von Wright. Translated by D. Paul and G. E. M. 
Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1969. 
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As human society turns into an ever more data-centric one, the famous saying stating that 
“Knowledge is power”, first attributed to Sir Francis Bacon8, gains a particular relevance. In fact, 
data is not knowledge per se, but can undoubtedly be one of its biggest sources, to the point of 
being called “the world’s most valuable resource” in the present9. Looking further ahead into the 
future and to what it holds, one cannot but wonder about the limits of our reality, and how they 
might be expanded if something like an artificially intelligent being is brought into existence, 
challenging Wittgenstein’s much-quoted phrase “The limits of my language mean the limits of 
my world” (TLP 5.6). 
 
1.2 On Language 
Written language is, as Galileo put it in his Dialogo10, a way to communicate one’s “most secret 
thoughts to any other person ... with no greater difficulty than the various collocations of twenty-
four little characters upon a paper”. 
In fact, humanity’s ability to effectively communicate through the use of a language, both 
verbally and textually, marks one of the greatest achievements in human evolution. But how can 
we define language? Is there a universal language or are there multiple types of language? What 
are the limitations of language? I will shortly provide an overview of these topics. 
 
1.2.1 The Concept of Language 
Let us start by looking at the definition of language in the dictionary. According to the Cambridge 
Online Dictionary11, language is “a system of communication consisting of sounds, words, and 
grammar, or the system of communication used by people in a particular country or type of 
work”. 
                                                          
8 I here refer to Bacon’s Meditationes Sacrae, 1597. 
9 Cf. “The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil but data”. The Economist, May 2017: 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-nolonger-oil-but-data 
10 Galilei, G. Di Dialogo di Galileo Galilei Linceo Matematico Supremo dell Studio di Padova, e Pisa. Dove ne i congressi 
di quattro giornate si discorre sopra i due massimi Sistemi del Mondo Tolemaico, e Copernicano, 1633. 
11 Cf. Cambridge’s Online Dictionary, “language”, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/language. 
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Examples: 
a) She does research into how children acquire language. 
b) Do you speak any foreign languages? 
c) I am hopeless at learning languages. 
d) the English language 
e) legal/technical language 
f) the language of business 
g) Java and Perl are both important computer programming languages (= systems of writing 
instructions for computers). 
 
This definition, together with the examples provided, helps us to understand how broad the 
concept of language is, and how it easily gains new meanings, namely with digitalization and the 
advent of computer programming languages. Yet, this definition does not show us the full 
picture. In fact, language is what stands between a receiver and an emitter of a message, but it 
is hard to grasp the full concept. If we ask the question “is music a language?”, most of us would 
surely say “yes”. And music, as a language, can transmit emotions, states of emotion or messages, 
as for instance a written language could. Are painting and photography languages? There is the 
saying that a picture is worth a thousand words, so we must be inclined to answer positively. 
Andrew Carstairs-McCarthy12 uses studies done on vervet monkeys, in which Cheney and 
Seyfarth13 show that these primates establish complex social relationships and effectively 
communicate through call systems to demonstrate that the communication mechanisms 
available to these primates is not so different from those of human languages. But then, what 
differentiates human language from the ways in which animals communicate? Human languages 
are certainly more complex and present more varied forms, but is not the goal very similar, 
namely to transmit a message? With this in mind and considering the assumption that language 
is only valid for humans, how can we then define language in a way that is clear and well limited? 
                                                          
12 Aronoff, M. and Rees-Miller, J. (ed.). The Handbook of Linguistics. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001, 1-20. 
13 Cheney, D. L., and Seyfarth, R. M., “The representation of social relations by monkeys”. Cognition 37(1-2), 1990, 
167–196 
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At first sight, it appears that the answer to our last question is that we cannot define language in 
any clear and well limited manner. But what if we recede from the concept we generally use and 
reflect on the fundamental reason why we use what we call language? Considering this from a 
different perspective, how would we create a reality where we would place beings gifted with 
reasoning and external sensorial inputs able to interpret that ‘virtual’ reality? We think that 
language is precisely the tool we have to interpret reality. Using a different example and 
considering a computer chip, which is connected to a temperature sensor (a common 
thermometer), if we think, then, about how we make the computer chip ‘bip’ every time the 
temperature exceeds a limit threshold, a programming language is usually in between the two. 
Language seems to be exactly what stands between our reason and our senses. When we 
are speaking our native tongue or a language which we perfectly master, our thought is 
completely coherent and dependent on that language. When someone speaks to us, we do not 
have to think about the meaning of the words spoken. It almost seems to us as if our language 
interpretation skills are intuitive, instinctive and natural. When we hear a musical masterpiece, 
transmitting calmness and joy to us, we are also not thinking about the meaning of those 
frequencies, combined with the timbre of the notes being played, even though the effect on our 
brain is still there. Why is that so? Is it then possible that, through experience, our brains, via our 
languages, interpret reality? Is it then possible to think without a language? What would this 
mean for how we think about animal “languages”? 
In what follows, I will hopefully shed some light on these issues and also attempt to shed 
light on whether our definition of language can ever be applied outside an academic context. Our 
questions do not seem to be out of place and it was only in 2006 when Chomsky confirmed how 
far behind we still are regarding the study and comprehension of the human language:  
 
[t]he study of language and other higher human mental faculties is proceeding much as chemistry 
did, seeking to “establish a rich body of doctrine”, with an eye to eventual unification, but without 
any clear idea of how this might take place.14 
                                                          
14 Chomsky, N. On Nature and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
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Two other concepts are important when we come to look at Wittgenstein’s work. These concepts 
are ‘assertion’ and ‘proposition’. Giving the quasi-technical nature of these concepts and the 
broad range of definition they encompass, I will use a definition which I believe to be coherent 
with Wittgenstein’s use of these concepts. 
 
Assertion: A linguistic act - either spoken or written - that has a truth value. 
Proposition: The content of an assertion, the underlying meaning of that specific 
linguistic act. 
 
1.2.2 Language Acquisition 
The process behind language acquisition has puzzled mankind for millennia. Protagoras (490-420 
BC), Plato (428-348 BC) and Aristotle (384-322 BC) were among the first philosophers to associate 
words with ideas and with the interpretation of reality15. They hypothesized that the origin of 
language might have to do with human speech organs and brain structure, but did not present 
us with consequential developments. The majority of the literature written at that time is of a 
philosophical nature and focused on questions pertaining to rational doubt, namely whether 
language is natural to or a creation of man. With questions without answers, it was only natural 
that the inquisitive nature of man led him to start experimenting. Frederick II of Sicily (1194-1250 
AD) allegedly carried out experiments on people to get a better understanding of reality through 
reasoning. One of these experiments consisted in imprisoning new-born children, who were kept 
alone, to see if they would develop any natural language as their voices matured. The result was 
that those children were speech impaired and could only communicate through clapping their 
hands and using gestures16. Experiments similar to this one have been performed since then with 
                                                          
15 See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sophists/ (accessed 10/05/2019), with reference to Plato’s Cratylus and 
Aristotle’s De Interpretatione. 
16  Baird, J. L et al., The Chronicle of Salimbene de Adam. Binghamton, New York: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & 
Studies, 1986. 
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the same results. Children reared in that way do not possess the ability to speak and can only 
communicate with each other through signs. L’Enfant Sauvage is perhaps one of the best 
examples of this17 . 
In Europe, religious authority and a dogmatic culture prevented further developments of 
the topics related to the origin and development of languages until the fifteenth century with the 
protestant reformation and later the Enlightenment. The introduction of the Index Librorum 
Prohibitorum by the Roman Catholic Church is one of the best examples of attempts made to 
limit autonomous critical thinking among Catholics. This Index, only formally abolished in the 
twentieth century, contained works such as Johannes Kepler’s Epitome astronomiae 
Copernicanae and Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. It was only in the nineteenth century 
that Darwin presented us the rationale for a better understanding of how the human language 
may have evolved and why18. In fact, his idea that humans have an “instinct to learn” reveals how 
the development of knowledge allowed for a faster adaptation and evolution as a species19. This, 
coupled with his “Musical Protolanguage” hypothesis, sets up the rationale for understanding 
how important knowledge is for us as a species and the role that language played in our 
development and in the development of knowledge itself. By now it seems clear that the ability 
for humans to learn languages is innate20. The question that might still arise is whether or not 
this ability to learn languages appears as a constraint of the type "If and only if...’ in the 
knowledge construction process. It appears to be so, as children raised without access to 
language and to a normal development are forever impaired in their cognitive functions and, 
therefore, limited in their knowledge construction process. 
                                                          
17 Itard, J., “Mémoire (1801) et Rapport (1806) sur Victor de l’Aveyron”, in Les enfants sauvages: mythes et réalité. 
Paris: Éditions Frances Loisirs, 2002, 119-246. 
18 Darwin, C. The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. London: John Murray, 1871. 
19 Darwin develops these ideas on both his works: Darwin, C. The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. 
London, 1871, and On the Origin of Species. London, 1859. 
20 Marler presents the idea that the ability to learn is instinctive in “The instinct to learn”, in Carey, S. and Gelman, 
R. (eds.), The Epigenesis of Mind: Essays on Biology and Cognition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1991, 37-66. Fitch is 
another author that can be used with reference to this subject. For more details, see Fitch, W. T., “Innateness and 
human language: A biological perspective”, in Tallerman, M. and Gibson, K. R. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Language Evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 143-156. 
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In 2017, Fitch established a comprehensive review of the empirical approaches used to 
study language evolution, showing how dispersive and complex the study of the human language 
is, suggesting that a “deep understanding of this ancient problem may be attainable in the next 
few decades”21. 
 
1.3 On Knowledge 
The origin of all the difficulties associated with knowledge starts and ends with the human being, 
which, whilst rational in nature, is also sensorial in nature. This anthropological dichotomy 
between rationality and sensibility raises barriers in our access to reality, preventing it from being 
truly objective. In addition, our biological structure does not allow us to have complete access to 
this reality. It is in fact not difficult to accept Kant’s thesis that our natural way of thinking, 
primitive and biological in nature, leads us to believe that we truly have access to the thing in 
itself (Ding an sich), and not to seeing what we consider to be the thing in itself as a mere 
representation of reality. Throughout history, various thinkers have reached the same 
conclusion, namely that, for example, when looking at a statue, we do nothing more than to look 
from only one perspective at a time. We shall never be able to see all its sides in synchrony, and 
simultaneously perceive the interior of the marble that constitutes the statue, accessing the 
carbon molecules that integrate the marble. 
 The following subsections will present a short overview of the concepts of knowledge 
(1.3.1) and its possibilities (1.3.2). 
 
  
                                                          
21 Fitch, W. T., “Empirical approaches to the study of language evolution”, Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 24(1), 
2017, 3-33. 
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1.3.1 The Concept of Knowledge 
Let us start by looking at the definition of knowledge in the dictionary. According to the 
Cambridge Online Dictionary22, “knowledge” is “understanding of or information about a subject 
that you get by experience or study, either known by one person or by people generally”. 
 
Examples: 
a) Her knowledge of English grammar is very extensive. 
b) He has a limited knowledge of French. 
c) The details of the scandal are now common knowledge (= familiar to most people). 
d) She started to photograph the documents, safe in the knowledge that (= knowing that) she 
wouldn’t be disturbed for at least an hour.  
e) In this town there are only a couple of restaurants that to my knowledge (= judging from my 
personal experience and information) serve good food. 
 
This definition, while satisfactory for most inquirers, does not suffice for us. In fact, the examples 
presented above can at most be partly used as arguments in favor of Wittgenstein’s view of 
language-games (Sprachspielen)23. Furthermore, Wittgenstein followed a similar line of thought 
when he wrote on the Blue Book: 
 
When Socrates asks the question, ‘What is knowledge?’ he does not even regard it as a preliminary 
answer to enumerate cases of knowledge. If I wished to find out what sort of thing arithmetic is, 
I should be very content indeed to have investigated the case of finite cardinal arithmetic. (BB 
p.20) 
                                                          
22 Cf. Cambridge’s Online Dictionary, “knowledge”, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/knowledge 
23 Language-games, a concept introduced by Wittgenstein, defines the usage of language in a way that its 
understanding depends on certain rules, in close resemblance to a game. The understanding of the rules employed 
in a certain scenario allows the subject to play that “game”. In the same way that a football player has to be aware 
of all the things he or she can and cannot do in order to score a goal, a subject “playing” a language-game needs to 
be aware of the rules/context, otherwise implicit information can be lost and figures of speech such as irony can be 
mis(or not)understood. See §2 of the Philosophical Investigations for Wittgenstein’s own examples used to illustrate 
the concept. 
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 The word ‘knowledge’ as seen above does not possess one unique “meaning”, or “reference”, in 
Frege’s terminology, and its use in a sentence defines the objective with which it is employed by 
the speaker. This represents an example of what Wittgenstein tries to explain in his Philosophical 
Investigations:  
 
When philosophers use a word - “knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, “proposition”, “name” – and 
try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used 
in this way in the language-game which is its original home? – 
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (PI § 116) 
 
The context in which a given word is employed and the actors of the situation in which the word 
is employed make possible the language-games. A good example we can use to understand the 
usefulness of this concept is irony, where a speaker, usually through the employment of a 
falsehood, tries to convey a message of truth. The language-games illustrated above suffice to 
make us doubt that we can ever define a concept with such clarity such that it is perfectly 
prescribed and limited in use and meaning. Looking for a philosophical definition of the concept 
of knowledge, we must start with Plato, who defined knowledge as a “justified true belief”24. This 
definition asserts that for someone to know, it is not enough to say something that is true, for 
that is not knowledge. For one to know something, according to Plato’s definition, one must have 
a propositional attitude of truth towards something which corresponds to reality (is true) and 
that is justified, meaning that one must be able to present proof or testimony to support the 
claim. 
It was in 1963 when Edmund Gettier published a paper entitled “Is Justified True Belief 
Knowledge?”25, where through what became known as “Gettier-cases”, he showed that one can 
                                                          
24 Cornford, F. M. Plato’s Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato. London: Butler & Tanner 
Ltd, 1935. 
25 Gettier, E., “Is justified true belief knowledge?”, Analysis 23(6), 1963, 121-123.  
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have a justified true belief regarding a claim but still fail to know. How can this be so? This 
happens if the reasons for the belief, although justified, are false. I quote at length:  
 
...Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition: 
(f) Jones owns a Ford; 
... Smith selects three place names quite at random and constructs the following three 
propositions: 
(g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston; 
(h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona; 
(i) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk. 
 
Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). Imagine that Smith realizes the entailment of each of 
these propositions he has constructed by (f), and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the basis 
of (f). 
Smith has correctly inferred (g), (h), and (i) from a proposition for which he has strong evidence. 
Smith is therefore completely justified in believing each of these three propositions. Smith, of 
course, has no idea where Brown is. But imagine now that two further conditions hold. First, Jones 
does not own a Ford, but is at present driving a rented car. And secondly, by the sheerest 
coincidence, and entirely unknown to Smith, the place mentioned in proposition (h) happens 
really to be the place where Brown is. If these two conditions hold, then Smith does not know that 
(h) is true, even though (i) (h) is true, (ii) Smith does believe that (h) is true, and (iii) Smith is 
justified in believing that (h) is true.26 
 
This problem has been partially overcome by either dismissing these cases by stating that the 
Gettier cases involve insufficient levels of justification (a), by adding a fourth condition to validate 
a knowledge claim (b) or by trying to replace the justification criteria by other condition (c). 
                                                          
 
26 Ibid.: 122-123. 
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However, even if we admit (a) as being the reasonable response to the Gettier cases - by saying 
that Smith has no justification for claiming that Brown is in Barcelona - and that, therefore, his 
knowledge claim is not valid, the problem at hand still stands. What constitutes knowledge or, 
proceeding from (a), what constitutes sufficient levels of justification? If the standard for the 
attribution of these levels of justification are very high, then we fall into the skeptical trap. If we 
say that the standards of justification depend on the context, then we fall into contextualism. It 
seems as if well-defined boundaries for knowledge attribution are non-existent if we want to 
leave skepticism aside. 
 
1.3.2 Knowledge Possibilities 
One of the biggest challenges that knowledge faces is skepticism because it is logically very hard, 
if not impossible, to dismiss. In truth, when skeptics affirm that due to our limitations in terms of 
access to reality, we do not have the possibility of making knowledge attributions of any sorts, 
they present a strong case and seem to be correct. (We should however note that by saying that 
sceptics seem to be correct we are already making a knowledge attribution, which in principle 
goes against the global skeptic formulation. Nonetheless, it is hard to deny that a lot of our 
knowledge is insecure). This theme, which sparks great debate, has led many authors into trying 
to find ways to refute skepticism. Contextualism is one of the theories that pursues this objective. 
Contextualists argue that, on most occasions, we need not to adopt standards of knowledge 
equivalent to those proposed by skeptics under the risk of not being able to affirm anything.27 In 
the Tractatus, Wittgenstein wrote that “[w]hat can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof 
one cannot speak thereof one must be silent” (TLP, Preface). A radical skeptical perspective 
regarding this sentence would lead us to remain utterly in silence about everything. Sosa 
responds promptly to this skepticism in “Knowledge in Context, Skepticism in Doubt”28. But what 
can we really assert to be “knowledge”? Contextualism argues that knowledge depends on the 
                                                          
27 For an overview of epistemic contextualism, see Venturinha, N., Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist 
Epistemology (Cham: Springer, 2018).   
28 Sosa, E., “Knowledge in context, skepticism in doubt: The virtue of our faculties”, Philosophical Perspectives 2, 
1988, 139–155. 
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context in which the subject is inserted. This context, which can vary socially or following the 
meanders of a conversation, establishes the standards for our knowledge attributions29. Sosa 
builds on this idea by claiming that context determines which viable alternatives we ought to 
take into consideration when attributing knowledge30, defending that context can also provide 
viable alternatives for a given reality, and that might justify a change in the standards for 
knowledge attribution. 
 
1.4 Objectives 
As human languages expand in reach and form, from being written modes of communication to 
being instruments and technology that allow humans to computerize, mechanize and automate 
various tasks, we cannot but wonder if there are actual limits to human ingenuity, to human 
languages, to human knowledge and, ultimately, to human reality. In fact, when we state that 
the universe is infinite, are we implying that it has no limits physically or that we cannot reach 
(comprehend) these limits yet? By structuring the questions we would like to see answered, we 
get a better view of the objectives we propose ourselves: 
 
(i) Is knowledge even possible or are we (according to Wittgenstein) saying what should 
not be said? 
(ii) If knowledge is possible, in which conditions is it so? Are there limits to it? 
(iii) What is the relation between knowledge and language? 
(iv) Would knowledge be possible without a language? 
(v) What would the creation of an artificially intelligent being imply for knowledge? 
                                                          
29 Cohen and DeRose are relevant references regarding contextualist views on knowledge attributions. For more 
details, see Cohen, S., “Knowledge and context”, The Journal of Philosophy 83, 1986, 574–583, and DeRose, K. The 
case for contextualism: Knowledge, skepticism, and context. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.  
30 For Sosa’s view on relevant alternatives, see Sosa, E., “Relevant alternatives, contextualism included”, 
Philosophical Studies 119, 2004, 35–65. 
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Wittgenstein’s work and subsequent academic research on the topics developed by this author 
can help us to reflect upon the foundations of knowledge, and demonstrate that language can 
be seen as the mechanism that allows for a constructive interpretation of reality. This will require 
establishing assumptions and putting aside certain perspectives, namely skeptical ones, in order 
to demonstrate that knowledge is possible and in which conditions that is so. In this sense, the 
primary goals of this dissertation are:  
 
a) to use Wittgenstein’s work to show that there is a link between language and 
knowledge; 
b) to show that knowledge is possible and that human evolution is driven by the 
development of knowledge; 
c) to show that we, in fact, are limited by our language and that more knowledge is 
only possible when we expand our language.  
 
Second, we want to look further ahead into the future and try to glimpse into what it might hold. 
What will be revealed to us by the advent of artificial intelligence? Should we proceed full steam 
ahead? What are the challenges we might expect? Inside a fully mechanized society, what place 
is left for the human being? 
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1.5 Thesis Outline 
This dissertation is divided into 4 chapters, including the present, introductory one.   
Chapter 2 sets the ground for knowledge attributions, to the conditions required for us to 
establish knowledge, and to try to dismiss the skeptical perspective of whether we are ever able 
to know. In this chapter we also try to understand how exactly it is that knowledge is constructed 
by children and how the human construction of knowledge led us to our current civilizational 
status.  
Chapter 3 intends to introduce us to the balcony which we arrive at having used 
Wittgenstein’s ladder. In this chapter, the analysis of how Wittgenstein’s work can truly be seen 
as a ladder, which we have to use and then let go of, will be performed, namely in terms of how 
can we use Wittgenstein’s work as a way to improve knowledge acquisition. This chapter also 
includes a short analysis of artificial intelligence. 
Finally, chapter 4 presents the conclusions of this dissertation and how the work 
developed could be improved or built on, with the aim of gaining a closer look at the logical place 
Wittgenstein thought of. 
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2. Language and Knowledge 
In this chapter the relation between knowledge and language will be analyzed. Firstly, we shall 
begin by presenting Wittgenstein’s perspective on language (section 2.1). Afterwards, we will 
present Wittgenstein’s perspective on knowledge (section 2.2). Later, we will use Wittgenstein’s 
work to show that there is a link between language and knowledge (section 2.3). The final two 
sections of this chapter will be dedicated to a chronological analysis of Wittgenstein’s work, 
where a comparison between his early and later work will serve as a canvas for the hypothesis 
we will present regarding knowledge acquisition and the role played by language in this process 
(section 2.4). 
 
2.1 Wittgenstein on Language 
In proposition 5.6 of the Tractatus Wittgenstein writes: “The limits of my language mean the 
limits of my world.” This proposition embodies, in a certain sense, the early Wittgenstein’s 
perspective on language. What is at stake is that language relates us in a strict way with the world, 
with our world, and logic is intrinsically connected with language. Wittgenstein also says that:  
 
It is no more possible to present something “contradicting logic” in language than to present a 
figure contradicting the laws of space in geometry by means of its co-ordinates, or, say, to give 
the co-ordinates of a point that does not exist. (NB, 16.5.15) 
 
Given that logic is so connected with our language, our limits seem to locate themselves precisely 
at the boundaries of it. In this way, how does proposition 5.6 of the Tractatus allows us to think 
critically and objectively about our own logical limits? Besides this question, which we believe to 
be fundamental, two others arise: 
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(i) Are we (logically) totally limited by our own language? 
(ii) If we are totally limited by our own language, does that mean that in order for us to 
expand our world we have to expand our language? But how can this be?  
 
If the possibility of expanding our language did not exist, our world would be unique and 
unchangeable throughout our existence. This idea is, however, incoherent with the human 
experience. As children, we learn how to speak, how to read, how to write, how to perform 
mathematical operations, we learn about geography and history. Would any of these actions be 
possible without language? As we grow up and our understanding of the world augments, we 
see the need to expand our comprehension of the reality that surrounds us. We pursue careers 
in mathematics, in physics, in linguistics, fine arts and architecture. The need to understand 
different cultures makes us learn new languages. The desire to understand a symphony might 
lead us to study musical theory. Would any of this be possible without language? Let us assume, 
for now, that we can indeed expand our language. If that is the case, can our language be unique? 
 
But is language:  the only language? (NB, 29.5.15) 
 
Proposition 5.61 of the Tractatus reveals a clear association between language and logic saying 
that “Logic fills the world; the limits of the world are also its limits”. The limits of the world must 
therefore be tantamount to logic, which means that the language must also coincide with logic 
or, at the very least, be ruled by it. Wittgenstein clarifies this idea and answers the question he 
himself had placed on 29 May 1915: 
 
That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the language I 
understand) mean the limits of my world. (TLP 5.62) 
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What may look like a purely solipsist perspective on existence is much more than that.31 With 
this proposition Wittgenstein is (indirectly) saying that our access to existence is not only 
dependent on the representation we make of existence through the use of our senses, but that 
this representation is also dependent on our language, which is individual and establishes the 
limits of our (individual) reality. This leads him to the conclusion that “I am my world. (The 
microcosm.)” (TLP 5.63) 
The idea that we are our own world is admissible and logically so, if we think of ourselves 
as entities separated from the reality that surrounds us and that, at the same time, we cannot 
dissociate ourselves from that same reality. If we believe in the laws of physics, we cannot but 
wonder about how humans once believed that the earth was the center of the solar system and 
the entire universe. This change from a geocentric perspective to a heliocentric one represents 
nothing more than a language expansion, representing an expansion of how we perceive the 
reality of our own world. In this sense, proposition 5.63 makes an important contribution to the 
understanding that each individual being is a microcosm of reality and that the conception of a 
“macro” reality is different for each being. 
At this point, an important question arises: more vital than knowing if language 
establishes the boundaries of our own world, one can ask: does language itself have a limit? If 
so, then it means that the limits of our world are in fact well defined, even though we cannot 
perceive/reach them yet.  
On the other hand, if language is unlimited, does that mean that our world is also 
limitless? It is well known that the fact that A implies B does not mean that B implies A 
reciprocally. Being bound by language (from within), it might be difficult to ever answer this 
question without creating room for uncertainty. But we can think that, as a fish in an aquarium 
can realize that there is a reality beyond the glass, so we might as well be able to realize that 
there is something beyond the frontiers of the reality that permeates us. However, the fish that 
                                                          
31 A complete discussion of the issue of solipsism in Wittgenstein lies outside the scope of this work. See Hacker. P. 
M. S., Insight and Illusion (Bristol. Thoemmes Press, 1997), Chapters IV and VIII, and Venturinha, N., Lógica, Ética, 
Gramática (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 2010), §8, as well as Venturinha, N., “Wittgenstein Reads 
Nietzsche: The Roots of Tractarian Solipsism”, in Ramharter, E. (ed.), Unsocial Sociabilities: Wittgenstein’s Sources 
(Berlin: Parerga, 2011), 59-74. 
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extracts oxygen from the water he lives in does not have access to the reality beyond the limits 
made by the aquarium tanks. Can our own thoughts also be limited by something like the tanks 
in which fishes live in an aquarium?  On this particular subject, Wittgenstein said that his goal in 
philosophy would be precisely to try and discover the limits of our reality, so that we, as the fish, 
can see beyond these limits. 
 
What is your aim in philosophy?--To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.                                             
(PI, Part I §309) 
 
Wittgenstein searches then for the limits of our language, the limits of logic: 
 
It is all simply a matter of the existence of the logical place. But what the devil is this "logical 
place"?! (NB, 19.11.14) 
 
It is hard for us to conceive of an unchangeable logic that dictates which rules limit our human 
language-games, a pure, mathematical logic, which explains in which way thought is formed and 
in which way we can modify it.32 In order for us to achieve this, we would have to be able to move 
beyond the limits of language or, at the very least, be able to expand our language beyond a 
certain threshold. Nonetheless, thinking about great minds in history, responsible for the 
greatest feats of mankind, we come across a complication. It seems clear that, for instance, the 
discovery of the general relativity theory, by Albert Einstein, led to a significant expansion of what 
the limits of reality are. However, we may ask, whose reality is expanded by this theory? It seems 
certain that Albert Einstein only broadened the limits of language for those that could understand 
his discoveries and investigations. Of course the rest of the population benefited from Einstein’s 
                                                          
32 This is perhaps one important reason why Wittgenstein changed his line of reasoning from the Tractatus and the 
search for the logic behind thought and language to the Investigations and the establishment of language-games. 
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achievements, but has the language of these people been expanded in the same manner as the 
scientific community’s language for whom this discovery was a disruptive event? 
Up to this point, we can say that Wittgenstein’s work does indeed show that our language 
is connected with our understanding of reality, that our language is individual in nature, as it 
modulates each one’s thought and reality acquisition processes, and that our language is 
expandable. We have not yet been able to understand if language is or is not limited and what 
the role of language is in knowledge attributions and knowledge construction processes. The next 
sections will address these topics.33 To finish this section, let us realize that we are without doubt 
lost in a maze constructed by ourselves through language or, as Wittgenstein put it in 
Philosophical Grammar34: 
 
 Human beings are entangled all unknowing in the net of language. (PG, 462) 
 
2.2 Wittgenstein on Knowledge 
Although Wittgenstein’s work is generally better known for his focus on logic and the nature of 
language, he also reflected on epistemic notions such as “knowledge”, “belief”, “doubt” and 
“certainty”. These reflections are more evident in the work posthumously published as On 
Certainty.35 In this section, we will try to show how Wittgenstein’s philosophical reflections can 
help us judge epistemic concepts and notions.  
In section 1.1, we have already shown how Wittgenstein can state that the concept of 
“knowledge” is coupled with that of “language-game” in On Certainty. But how do Wittgenstein’s 
views on logic and language allow for an understanding of what knowledge might be and how it 
                                                          
33 Later Wittgenstein seems not to be so rigid in regard to the relation between language and reality. However, here 
I am still interested in the relationship between thought, reasoning and language, and I am considering mainly the 
Tractatus. 
34 Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Grammar. Edited by Rush Rhees. Translated by Anthony Kenny. Oxford: Blackwell, 
1974. 
35 On the edition of On Certainty, see Venturinha, N., “A Re-Evaluation of the Philosophical Investigations”, in 
Venturinha, N. (ed.), Wittgenstein After His Nachlass (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 143-156. 
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might be constructed? Let us start by presenting some of the author’s propositions from the 
Tractatus and the Notebooks and follow that with an analysis of those propositions.  
On 22 August 1914, Wittgenstein wrote that “Logic must take care of itself”. Two months 
later he would reinforce this idea by saying “Logic takes care of itself; all we have to do is to look 
and see how it does it.” (NB, 13.10.14) This proposition would later on reappear in the Tractatus 
[TLP 5.473] and represents the concept that would develop into the thought behind “logical 
space”. This idea of “logical space”, similar in significance to Plato’s “world of ideas” and Frege’s 
“third realm”, represents the idea that there is a segregated space where logic lies.36 The notion 
that something as a logical place might exist appears when Wittgenstein finds it difficult to 
establish a direct relationship between reality, logic and language.  
 
I always said that truth is a relation between the proposition and the situation, but could never 
pick out such a relation.37 
… 
The proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it. (NB, 27.10.14) 
 
With the statements above, two very important aspects emerge. The first is that the true value 
of a given proposition is related with the fact, that is, with reality in itself. The second is that the 
proposition is a model of reality, which means that language is a model of reality. However, 
Wittgenstein cannot establish in which way the proposition relates to a fact, which is obvious 
once we think about our language limitations38. How is this related to knowledge? He writes: 
 
                                                          
36 Even though Wittgenstein appears to be critical of Frege’s view about logic (see Tractatus 4.0312, for example), 
he, like Plato and Frege, has a metaphysics that goes with his views about logic. 
37 This can be seen as an anticipation of the problems Wittgenstein would encounter (or re-encounter) later on and 
that made him change his perspective on language from the Tractatus to the Investigations. 
38 We can never really access the fact, the same way that we do not have access to reality in itself. Our 
cognitive/sensitive limitations do not allow us to establish the relation between fact and the content of an assertion. 
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In order to be able to frame a statement at all, we must--in some sense--know how things stand 
if the statement is true (and that is just what we portray).  
The proposition expresses what I do not know; but what I must know in order to be able to say it 
at all, I shew in it. (NB, 24.10.14) 
 
So, in order for us to assert something about anything, we need “to know” what we are asserting. 
This makes sense given the definition of assertion presented in section 1.2.1. But, then, what is 
it “to know”? Is it possible that we are standing in front of a chicken and egg situation39? It seems 
as if knowledge and language are more interconnected than we might initially think. In On 
Certainty Wittgenstein states that 
 
“For “I know” seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it 
as a fact. One always forgets the expression “I thought I knew”. (OC § 12)  
 
Regarding the concept of knowledge, Wittgenstein, at times, seems close to accepting something 
like Plato’s definition40. In On Certainty, for example Wittgenstein says: 
 
“If I know something, then I also know that I know it, etc.” amounts to: “I know that” means “I am 
incapable of being wrong about that.” But whether I am so must admit of being established 
objectively. (OC § 16) 
                                                          
39 i.e., “a situation in which it is impossible to say which of two things existed first and which caused the other one” 
(cf. Cambridge Online Dictionary):  
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/pt/dicionario/ingles/a-chicken-and-egg-situation 
40 Wittgenstein recognizes a lot of diversity in the way we use ‘know’ and not all of his views are aligned with 
Plato’s definition of knowledge (e.g. Philosophical Investigations, §625 – Wittgenstein asks how you know that you 
have raised your arm, in §633 he discusses knowing what you were going to say). 
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“I know” often means: I have the proper grounds for my statement. So if the other person is 
acquainted with the language-game, he would admit that I know. The other, if he is acquainted 
with the language-game, must be able to imagine how one may know something of the kind. (OC 
§ 18) 
 
Still, how can we guarantee something as a fact? If we go into details and use an example from 
quantum mechanics, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle states that both the position and the 
velocity of a subatomic particle, such as a proton or electron, cannot be known (known in the 
sense of established) for the same instant of time. What does this mean from a philosophical 
point of view? Does it mean that we cannot really know?  
Wittgenstein proceeds with his logical enquiries by relating our use of the verb “to know” with 
our senses and our inner world/consciousness, and by introducing the concept of “certainty”. 
 
“I know” has a primitive meaning similar to and related to “I see” (“wissen”, “videre”). And “I knew 
he was in the room, but he wasn’t in the room” is like “I saw him in the room, but he wasn’t there”. 
“I know” is supposed to express a relation, not between me and the sense of a proposition (like “I 
believe”) but between me and a fact. So that the fact is taken into my consciousness. (Here is the 
reason why one wants to say that nothing that goes on in the outer world is really known, but 
only what happens in the domain of what are called sense-data.) This would give us a picture of 
knowing as the perception of an outer event through visual rays which project it as it is into the 
eye and the consciousness. Only then the question at once arises whether one can be certain of 
this projection. And this picture does indeed show how our imagination presents knowledge, but 
not what lies at the bottom of this presentation. (OC § 90) 
 
The concept of certainty thus presupposes the concept of doubt. Or, to put it the other way 
round: 
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If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of 
doubting itself presupposes certainty. (OC § 115) 
Doubting and non-doubting behavior. There is the first only if there is the second. (OC § 354) 
 
It is a contention of this dissertation that this is a valid argument against global skepticism. 
Wittgenstein continues his thought by exposing how we live our daily lives without doubting what 
we believe to be acquired certainties, that is, beliefs which are grounded on what we “learn” as 
being right or wrong. He claims: 
 
The picture of the earth as a ball is a good picture, it proves itself everywhere, it is also a simple 
picture - in short, we work with it without doubting it. (OC § 147)  
 
However, how can one be sure he/she believes in the correct “facts”? How can we justify our 
beliefs? Wittgenstein gives us an answer when he avers: 
 
The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing. (OC § 166) 
 
In reality, most of our beliefs and assertions are not doubted41. We first believe what we read in 
history books, what our professors tell us, what our parents teach us. We live our lives believing 
                                                          
41 As Moore also shows in “Certainty”. In Philosophical Papers. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959. 
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that we are certain about multiple aspects of our reality, even if we do not have grounds for those 
beliefs and certainties. 42 Wittgenstein observes: 
 
I act with complete certainty. But this certainty is my own. (OC § 174) 
We know that the earth is round. We have definitively ascertained that it is round. We shall stick 
to this opinion, unless our whole way of seeing nature changes. ”How do you know that?” - I 
believe it. (OC § 291) 
 
The author relates our incapacity to doubt with the way we interact through language games. 
 
For how can a child immediately doubt what it is taught? That could mean only that he was 
incapable of learning certain language games. (OC § 283) 
 
Regarding certainty the author states that: 
 
With the word “certain” we express complete conviction, the total absence of doubt, and thereby 
we seek to convince other people. That is subjective certainty.  
                                                          
42 From here follows the argument that led many philosophers to treat knowledge as belief. Rhees addresses this in 
section 12 (On Certainty’s Main Theme) of his Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: There - Like Our Life. Oxford: Blackwell, 
2003. See also Moore, G. E., “A Defence of Common Sense”. In: Contemporary British Philosophy (second series), ed. 
J. H. Muirhead. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1925, 192-233; and Moore, G. E., “Proof of an External World”. 
Proceedings of the British Academy 25, 1939, 273-300 for the arguments that are on the basis of Wittgenstein’s 
responses in On Certainty. 
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But when is something objectively certain? When a mistake is not possible. But what kind of 
possibility is that? Mustn’t mistake be logically excluded? (OC § 194) 
 
The difficulty lies in logically excluding mistakes. This thought leads us to agree with Wittgenstein 
when in the final proposition of the Tractatus he states “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one 
must be silent” (TLP 7). In Philosophical Grammar, the author expresses a similar point of view: 
“Where you can ask you can look for an answer, and where you cannot look for an answer you 
cannot ask either. Nor can you find an answer.” (PG, 377). The problem with this is: what can we 
then talk or ask about? Should we not start to question the basic concepts underlying our 
language and our thought processes? But can we find our way out of the maze? Does this maze 
even have an exit? A passage from On Certainty is again illuminating:  
 
And in fact, isn’t the use of the word “know” as a preeminently philosophical word altogether 
wrong? If “know” has this interest, why not “being certain”? Apparently because it would be too 
subjective. But isn’t “know” just as subjective? Isn’t one misled simply by the grammatical 
peculiarity that “p” follows from “I know p”? ”I believe I know” would not need to express a lesser 
degree of certainty. - True, but one isn’t trying to express even the greatest subjective certainty, 
but rather that certain propositions seem to underlie all questions and all thinking. (OC § 415) 
 
It seems more and more as if the concepts we use in everyday language are flawed – or perhaps 
it is our language that is flawed – and that they do not allow for a clear understanding of what 
they try to define. The author had already tried to untangle these concepts earlier in On Certainty: 
 
“I have compelling grounds for my certitude.” These grounds make the certitude objective.           
(OC § 270) 
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I know = I am familiar with it as a certainty. (OC § 272) 
 
At more than half-way through On Certainty, Wittgenstein implicitly suggests that the more he 
“knows” the more he realizes how much he does not know. 
 
Is my understanding only blindness to my own lack of understanding? It often seems so to me. 
(OC § 418) 
 
And then, it seems as if the author tried to question the nature of our language.43 
 
Suppose that in a certain language there were no word corresponding to our “know”. – The people 
simply make assertions. (“That is a tree”, etc.) Naturally it can occur for them to make mistakes. 
And so they attach a sign to the sentence which indicates how probable they take a mistake to be 
– or should I say, how probable a mistake is in this case? This latter can also be indicated by 
mentioning certain circumstances. For example “Then A said to B ’...’ I was standing quite close to 
them and my hearing is good”, or “A was at such-and-such a place yesterday. I saw him from a 
long way off. My eyes are not very good”, or “There is a tree over there: I can see it clearly and I 
have seen it innumerable times before”. (OC § 443)  
 
Wittgenstein therefore puts certainty - and implicitly, all the remaining concepts - at the level of 
the language-games. He adds:  
                                                          
43 In the same way that Wittgenstein tried to question and to describe logic. See §501 and Section 9 (On Certainty: 
A Work in Logic) of Rhees, R. Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: There - Like Our Life. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003. 
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Do I want to say, then, that certainty resides in the nature of the language-game? (OC § 457) 
 
Wittgenstein clearly has more doubts than certainties. It seems as if our definition of knowledge 
is too out of reach using our language limitations. Regarding fact and truth, it seems logical that 
for one to know implies that one must be aware of a relation between reality and what is being 
said in such a way that one corresponds to the other and, as the author wrote, 
 
It is always by favour of Nature that one knows something. (OC § 505) 
 
The relation between fact and reality is what seems to be unattainable. Throughout On Certainty, 
as in the Tractatus and the Investigations, Wittgenstein seems to be trying to discover what can 
and cannot be said, regarding our language as the grounds for our assertions and propositions. 
Logic plays an important part in this process, but we should be careful since our logic is tainted 
by our language, as we will see more in detail in the next section. Regarding Wittgenstein’s works 
and the concept of knowledge we use on a daily basis, it seems as if knowledge is not something 
that appears a priori, nor that it is something that only belongs to a subject’s inner world.  
We have so far seen how difficult it is to define what knowledge is and in which conditions 
it is possible. In the next section, we will try to show how knowledge appears in the context of 
language and that it is through language that knowledge is constructed. We will end this section 
with a proposition from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, which we believe is a good starting-point 
for the topic under discussion in the next section. 
 
Knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement. (OC § 378) 
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2.3 Wittgenstein and the link between Language and Knowledge 
In this section we will attempt to show that even though Wittgenstein focused on logic and 
language in most of his philosophical reflections, his work goes hand in hand with epistemic 
concepts, and we cannot dissociate his reflections on logic and language from the concepts 
associated with knowledge.  
In this phase of our work we can already state that language and knowledge are 
connected. However, it is the way they connect and how that allows for language and knowledge 
expansion that interest us the most. In light of Wittgenstein’s work we can already say that in 
many cases knowledge presupposes a correct link between “fact” and “reality” and that a fact is 
true when there is a correspondence with reality.  
 
The first thing that the theory of logical portrayal by means of language gives us is a piece of 
information about the nature of the truth-relation. (NB, 20.10.14) 
 
We will see further ahead what can be said about the fundamentals for this correspondence. Let 
us only say now that a fact corresponds to a thought about reality which occurs internally, which 
we believe as correct and which we externalize through language. Let us also say that we 
communicate through the usage of language and so language is both a way for us to connect our 
inner world to the outer one as well as a way for us to think – communicate internally. 
Wittgenstein showed that there are certain things about which we should remain in silence. Is 
that completely true? Or can we say that it is exactly by speaking up about what should not be 
spoken that we allow our thoughts, our logic, our knowledge and language the possibility for 
expansion? Do we not need to throw away the ladder Wittgenstein showed us in order to see 
further? How does Wittgenstein’s work allow us to understand this problematic?  
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Let us take a look at an example. The discovery of the ratio between the perimeter of any 
given circumference and its own radius, the ratio demonstrated as being constant for any 
circumference originated the concept of π. This concept was incorporated into human language 
and knowledge and expanded both, but then comes the question about what lies beneath these 
expansions. Surely, the cause for this language and knowledge expansion was not the attribution 
of the symbol π to this universal mathematical reason. Then, it must have been the recognition 
of this ratio as a logical rule on reality. The integration of the concept π in our language is 
therefore independent from the symbol that we might use to designate the concept. The 
symbolic attribution must have come a posteriori. This leads us to believe that language had to 
do with more than the simple attribution of symbols, as Wittgenstein leads us to believe right at 
the beginning of his Philosophical Investigations: 
 
"Something red can be destroyed, but red cannot be destroyed, and that is why the meaning of 
the word 'red' is independent of the existence of a red thing." (PI §57) 
 
Still regarding this example of the concept of π, what can we say about knowledge? Does the 
introduction of this concept in the science books mean that this concept has been taken on board 
by every human being born after that moment? The same goes for the example given about 
Albert Einstein and the theory of general relativity. It is easy to reply “no”. What does this mean? 
For one it means that knowledge, as language, is individual in nature. It also makes us wonder 
about the origin of knowledge and its use, in order to be able to define it. Biologically speaking, 
the ability to inform others about historical events or to tell them stories represents the potential 
to warn other members of your community about dangers you have faced, how they were 
overcome and many other possibilities – in summary, to teach. And what does the ability to teach 
represent? It represents the most significant biological advantage of all, the ability to learn – 
construct knowledge - without experimenting with reality. But what does “to learn” mean? To 
learn means to be able to understand reality. Can we then “mislearn” something? How does a 
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child learn how to doubt? If the teaching is incorrect – that is, does not represent reality 
coherently – we acquire an inadequate “knowledge”. If reality proves us wrong, we understand 
the concept of doubt. Adapting one of Wittgenstein’s examples, in several cases we say that the 
earth is spherical. Is the Earth mathematically spherical? It is not. Can I be certain of it? I cannot, 
for I have not verified it with my own eyes. Could I trust my eyes even if I did? But I believe it, for 
I have been told that measurements were made and even that the earth was found to be 
flattened around the poles. Then, what makes it fine for six year old kids to grasp the concept of 
earth as being perfectly spherical, and not be fine for a fifteen year old one to do so in a physics 
test? We can say that it is the context, opting for a contextualist perspective. Or, we can say that 
in one case, it is adequate to do so, in the sense that for a six year old it is more important to 
understand the concept of earth as having a round shape than the fact that the distance in a 
straight line between the mass center of earth and the last layer of its atmosphere varies from 
point to point. 
This line of thought leads us to a definition of knowledge more in line with contextualism. 
Can we completely dismiss the skeptical argument of not being able to trust anything? We 
cannot. For the time being, the skeptical argument is something to pass over in silence, as it does 
not add anything to the table. It is true that we cannot have access to reality itself and if that 
means that we cannot know, then we think that the problem does not reside in reality itself but 
in the concept of knowledge we use. As Wittgenstein saw, if we can imagine a language where 
the concept of knowledge does not exist as we discuss it, and where people who use that 
language only make assertions of the type “That is a tree”, to know or not to know turns into a 
nonsensical discussion. Much more important than having 100% certainty about the algorithms 
that constitute the number π, we believe that it is to have an adequate “knowledge” of the 
concept at hand. This means that sometimes the “knowledge” that π is 3.14 might be sufficient. 
We could imagine a language much more rational and objective, based on proposition 6.54 of 
the Tractatus44. Communities made out of people with a very rational and objective mindset 
                                                          
44 “My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when 
he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has 
climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.” (TLP 6.54) A language based 
on this proposition could be built by recognizing the limitations of our current means of communication and by 
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would love that language, although there would still be a lot we would have to remain in silence 
about, and it would lead to an over complexification of language, as one would not be able to 
simply say that π is 3.14, and would have also to say why that approximation is being used in the 
context at hand. 
For the time being, the way we use our language allows for a lot of room for error, but if 
one is familiar with the language – or should we say language-games – and its nuances, the 
primary objective of that language is fulfilled, a message can be transmitted with little 
interference and a better (more adequate) representation of reality can be made. Human 
knowledge did not evolve because we were trying to say everything correctly the first time 
around, but because we discovered flaws with the way we dealt with the physicality of the 
universe – our language was not adequate – and we tried to diminish the wrongs in our 
representation of reality. So the question now is not if we can say anything with 100% certainty, 
but whether we can establish knowledge in the sense of giving an adequate response to reality, 
and if so, in which conditions. 
We might find ourselves before a semantics problem. If we say that there are no 
conditions for us to know, does not that imply that the conditions to know must exist, even if 
they are currently out of reach? 
 
2.4 Early vs Later Wittgenstein on Language and Knowledge 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical journey is as peculiar as the author’s life. The author’s engineering 
background helps us understand his objective interest in reality and the thought process behind 
the Tractatus, the diary notes published in the Notebooks 1914-1916, the pursuit for one truth 
and the relationship between reality and himself through logic.45 Analyzing the Tractatus and the 
Investigations, together with the observations that comprise the Notebooks, the reader might at 
                                                          
merely allowing the description of events. See page 27 and OC §443. For instance, in this fictitious language, the 
sentence “that is a tree” would be senseless. One could alternatively say “I see a tree” - The “brain in a vat” is always 
a threat. However, would such a language allow knowledge? 
45 See Hacker. P.M.S., Insight and Illusion (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1997). 
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first be under the impression that Wittgenstein’s thought changed radically from his earlier to his 
later work, considering the different perspectives with which the author apparently approaches 
language in these two works. In fact, while the Tractatus seems to contemplate a pure logic 
behind language, the Investigations transmits the idea that the author rebelled against this view 
of a pure logic beneath language, with the elaboration of the language-games concept in the 
framework of which this or that sentence is allowed within certain contexts, within what the 
author sees as the language rules of engagement.46  
The author then tries to search for the rules which would allow a sentence to make sense 
while others would not. This might suggest to us that Wittgenstein has changed his mind over 
time. However, what might initially look like a complete change of perspective, may not 
correspond to the reality given Wittgenstein’s proposition 6.54 from the Tractatus47: 
 
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as 
senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak 
throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then 
he sees the world rightly. (TLP 6.54) 
 
The author seems to be launching the motto for the thought behind the Investigations, which 
seems to be nothing more than the “logical” follow-up of the Tractatus and of his own inquisitive 
thoughts first written down in the Notebooks. In this sense, we must agree with Rhees when he 
                                                          
46 The concept of language-game also appears in other writings from Wittgenstein, but the Investigations give this 
concept context and body. 
47 Although Wittgenstein only got to publish the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus during his lifetime, the majority of 
his work that is available to us lets us realize how immense and complex his life’s work is and the impact his reasoning 
would have in the philosophical community. Can we now be able to climb all the steps of the ladder that Wittgenstein 
let go off? 
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states that “Wittgenstein’s earliest and last concern was: what does it mean to say 
something?”48. 
 
2.5 Knowledge and Intelligence 
After discussing knowledge, language and their connection using Wittgenstein’s work as the 
ground for these discussions, some remarks on intelligence are required and the relationship 
between knowledge and intelligence is also worthy of discussion. Intelligence, defined as the 
ability to learn, understand, make judgements and have opinions based on reason, is the ability 
that many believe distinguishes us from the other animals.  
The difference between knowledge and intelligence seems to lie in the applicability of one 
to the other, in the sense that knowledge can be regarded as information about reality that has 
meaning to intelligence49. Knowledge without intelligence is what can be described as an empty 
Great Library of Alexandria or an empty university. Intelligence without knowledge is potentia. 
Should we dare to say that intelligence is what allowed us to develop language and from then 
on, to relate rationally with reality and construct knowledge? 
One thing is certain. All the concepts we have been discussing were constructed by man 
and it is not surprising that we find their definitions conflicting and in a certain way merging 
together. In reality, nature does not have concepts about itself and just is. Even the definition of 
the word “concept” can be discussed or, as Wittgenstein wrote, “‘Concept’ is a vague concept”50 
(RFM §70, 433). We, as humans, tend to organize our understanding of reality in boxes and 
shelves, but we often find that we have questions that do not fit into any particular box and that 
spread in reach to multiples boxes. On the topic of intelligence, as the concept is generally 
understood, it is safe to say that it is human’s biggest asset in our quest to understand reality. 
Throughout history, the work philosophers have done in trying to discover the boundaries of 
                                                          
48 For further details, see Rhees, R. Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: There - Like Our Life. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, 6-11. 
49 Knowledge vs intelligence: The difference explained: https://simplicable.com/new/knowledge-vs-intelligence 
50 Wittgenstein, L. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Edited by G.E.M Anscombe, R. Rhees and G. H. von 
Wright. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1956. 
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what can be understood (notice we did not use the word know), and in which conditions we are 
able to do so, if any exist, help us comprehend our own limitations as a species that has already 
accomplished a lot, civilizationally speaking, but it is still riddled with anthropological related 
problems such as poverty, war and the destruction of the natural habitats that we inhabit.51 
We believe that the fact that we as humans are aware of our own limitations is one of the 
reasons that propels us to want to discover more and more and to gain a better grasp of reality 
so as to try to overcome these limitations. This is the reason why it makes sense for us to discuss 
the implications of the digital revolution and of artificial intelligence, the latter being a topic also 
discussed by Wittgenstein. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
51 The difficulty lies precisely in terms of language. Language, ever evolving and dependent on the speakers, adapts 
itself to the historical culture and values. Do we grasp all the concepts present in a Shakespeare play? Would 
Shakespeare understand English language as it is spoken today? 
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3. Language and Knowledge after 
Wittgenstein 
In this chapter, Wittgenstein’s inheritance will be presented. Firstly, we will make a short 
summary of the most important thoughts and remarks from Wittgenstein in order to analyze 
which part of Wittgenstein’s work turned out to be more impactful for society and how that truly 
represents what we will name “Wittgenstein’s ladder”. This will serve to help us understand how 
best to employ Wittgenstein’s work today (section 3.1). We will also discuss the advent of 
artificial intelligence in this chapter, its challenges and possibilities. 
 
3.1 Wittgenstein’s Legacy 
Contemplating Wittgenstein’s work, it is easily noticeable that a change occurred from the 
author’s early writings to his later ones. Is this change enough to warrant analyzing them 
separately, or should we just look at those differences as changes in perspective throughout his 
life? Did the author’s way of thinking really change that much? Wittgenstein’s work is such that 
his inquisitive nature is always at the forefront of his thoughts and that this author’s trodden 
path is in itself much more one of questions than one of answers, as we can see through the so 
called “difference” between the ideas displayed in the Tractatus and those displayed in the 
Investigations. Wittgenstein’s work is meaningful and its impact cannot be neglected. Here is a 
short summary of Wittgenstein’s main achievements which may help us to perceive how these 
can help us move further along. 
Without any doubt (should we even dare to say that?), propositions 6.54 and 5.6 of the 
Tractatus are two of Wittgenstein’s most recognizable remarks. These propositions, coupled with 
the concept of language-games introduced in the Investigations and with the analysis of entries 
in the Notebooks, are enough to give us some idea of what the author was up to and show us 
that he felt like he did not succeed at that as he initially thought he did in the Tractatus. Delving 
into Wittgenstein’s life and work, can we easily establish the truth and the falsehood in 
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Wittgenstein’s discourse? Can we recognize where he is right and where he is wrong? Can we do 
more than perhaps just talk about what we should not talk about? Was this not precisely what 
Wittgenstein was doing while searching for a closed logic behind language and while establishing 
the concept of language-games?  
The question still to be answered is: can we know anything at all? Perhaps we, as 
Wittgenstein stated in Philosophical Grammar52, can only ask certain questions and get the 
answers to those questions. Our knowledge would then be limited. Perhaps, the realization that 
we can only ask certain questions could lead us to understand that we are asking the wrong 
questions. Perhaps we should not ask if we can know, perhaps we should instead ask if we can 
understand, not ask if we can establish knowledge a priori but if our understanding of reality 
establishes an adæquatio.53 In this sense, Wittgenstein himself seem to be “adequate”. Even 
though his Tractarian propositions were very incisive and purposely conclusive, the majority of 
his works convey an open-ended message and more questions than answers are present. This I 
believe is the best example of “Wittgenstein’s ladder”. Not a ladder that we store for times in 
need, but a ladder that once used no longer serves us, for we have to find/build a different one 
to take us one step higher in the process of understanding the reality we are inserted in. It seems 
though as if a definite answer to the question “can we know and in which conditions?” will remain 
hidden for the time being. For now, we satisfy ourselves in “knowing” that we can understand 
our reality, and, perhaps more importantly, in “knowing” that we can better our understanding 
of reality and of ourselves.54 
The “truth” is that Wittgenstein is consequential. His work led to a great deal of discussion 
and the fact that we even find it necessary to discuss whether there is one, two or even three 
stages of “Wittgenstein” makes us aware of the importance of his life’s work.  
 For us, the biggest lesson we take from Wittgenstein is that knowledge is nothing if not 
used to build wisdom, where we use wisdom to mean an understanding of reality that presents 
                                                          
52 I here refer to section 2.2 of this thesis. 
53 See Venturinha’s take on adæquatio and his perspective on propositional meaning (Venturinha, N., Lógica, Ética, 
Gramática: Wittgenstein e o Método da Filosofia. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 2010, §4. b) to get 
another view on these concepts.  
54 We believe that this has been proved by human evolution. 
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utility for human beings. All the data, information and knowledge collected by humankind inside 
books, CDs, Hard-drives and Flash-drives represent nothing more than “potential energy”. Only 
relating with reality through language, expanding our “knowledge” and striving for wisdom can 
we truly utilize this “potential”, expand our world and understand our place in existence. 
 
3.2 AI and the “bit” Revolution 
 
The real problem is not whether machines think but whether men do.             
(B.F. Skinner, Contingencies of Reinforcement)55 
 
Since the invention of the wheel (in truth it had to be even before that), mankind has strived to 
do the greatest amount of work with the least amount of possible effort. In a humorous way, 
some of us even dare to say that human ingenuity arises from human’s laziness. What is a fact is 
that humans have developed complex processes and technologies to simplify our lives so that 
more time can be better spent elsewhere. Digital technology is no different.  
As of today, it is sometimes easier to get an answer to a question we have from the other 
side of the globe than it might be to ask a neighbor for eggs or flour. Technology has a lot of 
upsides and downsides. With the mechanization of complex tasks, the ability that robots 
nowadays have to work with the same level of precision relentlessly, and the development of 
new programming languages, making even more complex problems solvable, the question about 
what will happen to manual labor arises and a scenario where a machine with superintelligence 
appears is already imaginable for us. In this section there will be a brief discussion about the topic 
of artificial intelligence, namely regarding what artificial intelligence really is, the paths to get 
there, the dangers and challenges related to the broad scale implementation of artificial 
intelligence and the strategies we might have available to make sure the appearance of an 
                                                          
55 Skinner, B. F. Contingencies of reinforcement: A theoretical analysis. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969. 
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artificially intelligent being does not result in a Terminator like scenario. For this, our main 
theoretical support is the work Superintelligence by Nick Bostrom56. 
 Artificial Intelligence, generally regarded as the capacity a system/machine would have to 
think for itself and have cognitive functions like a human, such as learning and solving problems, 
can be better defined as the capacity present in an artificial system to understand its 
environment and to autonomously take actions to improve the probability of achieving its 
objectives and minimize the chance of failure. The concept “artificial intelligence” seems to have 
been coined by Alan Turing in the 1930’s57. Interestingly enough, Wittgenstein had long 
discussions with Turing in 1939, discussions that are available to us through Wittgenstein’s 
Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics58. In the 1930s Wittgenstein was also involved in 
philosophical reflections about whether a machine can think. In the Blue Book59, the author 
wonders about the concept of a ‘thinking machine’ and whether there is a real possibility of that 
happening. 
 
"Is it possible for a machine to think?" (whether the action of this machine can be described and 
predicted by the laws of physics or, possibly, only by laws of a different kind applying to the 
behaviour of organisms). And the trouble which is expressed in this question is not really that we 
don't yet know a machine which could do the job. The question is not analogous to that which 
someone might have asked a hundred years ago: "Can a machine liquefy a gas?" The trouble is 
rather that the sentence, "A machine thinks (perceives, wishes)": seems somehow nonsensical. It 
is as though we had asked "Has the number 3 a colour?" (BB, 47) 
 
                                                          
56 Bostrom, N. Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
57 Alan Turing is generally regarded as the father of AI and his work served not only to advance science and 
knowledge but to help the Allies in WWI. See Turing, A., “Intelligent machinery”, in B. Meltzer and D. Michie (eds), 
Machine Intelligence 5, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1948; “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, in 
Alan Ross Anderson (ed.), Minds and Machines, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1950; Intelligent 
Machinery: A Heretical View. Cambridge: Heffers, 1959. 
58 Wittgenstein, L., Wittgenstein’s lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. Cambridge, 1939: from the notes of 
R. G. Bosaquent, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees and Yorick Smythies. Edited by Cora Diamond. New York: Cornell 
University Pres, 1976. 
59 Wittgenstein, L., The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: Blackwell, 1958. 
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In the same period, in Philosophical Grammar, Wittgenstein wrote: 
 
If one thinks of thought as something specifically human and organic, one is inclined to ask "could 
there be a prosthetic apparatus for thinking, an inorganic substitute for thought?" But if thinking 
consists only in writing or speaking, why shouldn't a machine do it? "Yes, but the machine doesn't 
know anything." Certainly it is senseless to talk of a prosthetic substitute for seeing and hearing. 
We do talk of artificial feet, but not of artificial pains in the foot. 
"But could a machine think?"--Could it be in pain?--Here the important thing is what one means 
by something being in pain. I can look on another person--another person's body--as a machine 
which is in pain. And so, of course, I can in the case of my own body. On the other hand, the 
phenomenon of pain which I describe when I say something like "I have toothache" doesn't 
presuppose a physical body. (I can have toothache without teeth.) And in this case there is no 
room for the machine.--It is clear that the machine can only replace a physical body. And in the 
sense in which we can say of such a body that it is in pain, we can say it of a machine as well. Or 
again, what we can compare with machines and call machines is the bodies we say are in pain. 
(PG, 105) 
 
Perhaps more important than asking whether a machine can think, it is whether it can understand 
concepts, contexts, language-games, relate acquired knowledge with reality and learn from 
experience. And after we have those questions answered, we can wonder about the motivations 
an AI will have when thinking and evolving, believing that these processes have the potential to 
happen at a pace much faster than that of humans. While not directly addressing the AI 
problematic, Wittgenstein’s thoughts are very insightful and can, once again, be used as a 
“ladder” in the discussion on these concepts.60  
In order for us to understand the AI discussion, we need to distinguish two concepts, 
“superintelligence” and “artificial intelligence”. AI refers to intelligence that has a non-biological 
                                                          
60 Stuart Shanker does precisely this by using Wittgenstein’s remarks to discuss the foundation of AI, coupled with 
the concepts introduced by Turing. A complete discussion of the foundation of AI lies outside the scope of this 
dissertation but, for further developments, see Shanker, S., Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of AI 
(London: Routledge, 1998). 
41 
 
substrate, while there might be a biological form of superintelligence, namely if the biological 
processes that brought us to this state of intelligence continue to pressure our species in the 
direction of greater intellect. Naturally, when we think about an AI that has the same intellectual 
capabilities as humans have as of today, it is not difficult to believe that AI can easily surpass our 
general intelligence and become an artificial superintelligence. When one thinks about AI, what 
generally comes to mind is either a doomsday scenario where the human species is relegated to 
the sidelines, or a God-like scenario, where AI leads us to uncover all the secrets of the universe 
which are not in our reach. If we recognize both scenarios just presented as plausible, the 
contours of the problem at hand are far more reaching in their implications and challenges than 
this short description may entail. 
Regarding achieving AI technology, generally emulating a whole brain is the most 
commonly accepted way to think about how AI will be achieved. It represents the idea that we 
might eventually be able to understand well enough how our brains work and that we might be 
able to replicate this process in a machine by scanning and closely modelling our own brains, in 
fact creating an AI being. This idea presupposes great scientific and technological advances that 
are still only being theoretically discussed.  
Another point worthy of attention is the pace at which we will experience a 
superintelligence take-over. If we can create a machine that reaches our intellect in capability, 
when the time comes that a machine attains general intelligence at the human-level, how fast 
will it be until it achieves a level of intelligence multiple times that of humans? Will we see a slow 
take-off, over years or even decades, or a fast take-off, over minutes or hours? And once an AI 
project is successful, will it dominate and obscure all the remaining attempts at achieving AI or 
will there be multiple successful projects? The answers to these questions are for now out of 
reach, but these answers will dictate where we will arrive when an AI with an intellect superior 
to that of humans is reached. 
But the most important issue seems to be that of control and motivation of the AI. How 
can we guarantee that obtaining a super intelligent AI will be beneficial to humankind and that it 
will not lead to an extinction level event? What kind of motivations can we imprint the system 
with, in order to make sure it does not overrule its creators and that its objectives are coherent 
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with what we are trying to achieve with the creation of an artificial intelligence? In the same 
manner, what kind of protocols can we put in place in order to assure that the artificial 
intelligence(s) remain under our control? Can we modulate values and a morality system to try 
and keep the objectives of the AI under certain parameters? 
 The advent of an Artificial Superintelligence is an event disruptive enough that should 
scare us enough to make us think. “Us” as a species and “think” as to leave no logical, ethical… 
philosophical… rock unturned. The consequences of a programming “bug” at this level could 
prove to be disastrous and even though we tend to dismiss the consequences of the actions of a 
few, it has always been only a few details, a few people, that changed the course of history over 
and over. Would someone uncover the theory of general relativity had Einstein not existed? 
Would there have been World War II if Hitler had never been born? We will never know the 
answer to these questions, but we can be sure that to neglect the actions of a few is to gamble 
with the lives of millions. 
One of the most important questions that arises from the discussion about 
superintelligent artificial intelligence is whether knowledge is limited or unlimited.  So far we 
have already established that knowledge is a “vague” concept61 and that the answer to the 
question of whether we can actually know is not yet closed. AI will not help us find answers to 
questions that do not have them, and this might as well be one of those. However, if we can 
devise an AI that has the same “curiosity” as the human kind, we can rest assured that a lot of 
questions with which we struggle will be answered fairly easily by machines, and that those 
answers will be a very important help in our quest for understanding our micro-cosmos. 
 In line with the work of Nick Bostrom, and also a lot of the philosophical work developed 
by humanity, there seem to be more questions than answers. Sometimes it looks, however, as if 
the most important aspect is not to have all the answers, but to have had the opportunity to 
think about the different alternatives available and different ways one can think about a specific 
challenge. Considering all that has already been said and all that will still be said about AI, we find 
it fit to finish this section and chapter with an alert left by Nick Bostrom about Superintelligence:  
                                                          
61 Using Wittgenstein’s own words regarding concepts. See section 2.5. 
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Before the prospect of an intelligence explosion, we humans are all small children playing with a 
bomb. Such is the mismatch between the power of our plaything and the immaturity of our 
conduct. Superintelligence is a challenge for which we are not ready now and will not be ready 
for a long time. We have little idea when the detonation will occur, though if we hold the device 
to our ear we can hear a faint ticking sound.62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
62 Bostrom, N., Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 319. 
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4. Conclusions 
The main objective of this work was to study the concepts of language and knowledge and to try 
to understand if they are connected. For this we set ourselves to use Wittgenstein’s work to see 
if there is a link between language and knowledge. We proposed to show that knowledge is 
possible and that human evolution drives from it and to show that we, in fact, are limited by our 
language and that we can only expand our understanding of reality and construct knowledge 
when we expand our language. 
 Second, we intended to raise a discussion regarding what Wittgenstein helped us achieve 
so far and looking further into the future, to make a brief introduction to what it holds for us 
regarding the advent of artificial intelligence. 
 
4.1 Achievements 
The major achievements of the present work were the understanding that: 
(i) Language and knowledge must be connected; 
(ii) Language stands between subject and reality (inner and outer world); 
(iii) Our conception of reality is flawed by the own nature of the concepts we use in our daily 
‘language-games’ 
(iv) Wittgenstein’s work is a ladder for a better comprehension of the questions behind many 
philosophical problems; 
(v) We have new challenges ahead, namely regarding AI and its advent, but also a huge 
opportunity to expand our comprehension of the phenomena that surround us. 
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4.2 Future Work 
  
During the research developed for this dissertation, several topics worthy of discussion by 
themselves were found and they deserve to be mentioned: 
(i) A deeper analysis of linguistics and neurosciences could enrich the initial analysis of 
language; 
(ii) An analysis of the topics discussed here cannot be complete without an in-depth study of 
the precursors of Wittgenstein, namely Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell; 
(iii) Regarding the topics discussed in chapter 3, and specifically regarding Wittgenstein’s 
legacy, a more complete analysis of the authors that have studied and analyzed this 
author’s work could also help us enhance our own analysis. 
(iv) Still on chapter 3 and regarding the brief discussion on AI, it would be good to perform a 
more exhaustive discussion/comparison between the work of Turing and the work of 
Wittgenstein on the topics of machine intelligence. 
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